attitudes to the criminal law. As Devlin observed, trial by jury is 'an insurance that the criminal law will conform to the ordinary man's idea of what is fair and just '. 4 Cornish counters this assertion by holding that juries have not consistently defended the public interest in equity and justice but have been more likely to submit to oppressive laws such as the attack on freedom of speech by the sedition laws and the attack on freedom of association by anti-industrial union laws. 5 He goes on to claim in his book that the judges have been more relevant to the debate against oppressive laws in their pronouncements that juries.
However, to what extent a verdict can be described as perverse is a matter that deserves some investigation.
It is argued that no verdict delivered by a jury at the end of a criminal trial can be correctly described as perverse within the meaning of the word to the extent that a verdict of guilt or innocence is a matter for a jury as a result of deliberations on the evidence consequent upon a trial. Furthermore, to the extent that a jury's verdict is largely a subjective matter, 6 declaring a verdict to be perverse, by all other objective observers, is tantamount to a usurpation of the role of the jury and thus inconsistent with the concept of trial by jury.
Let us explore this further.
Where, in a Crown Court trial, an accused pleads 'not guilty' to a charge and the plea has been rejected by the prosecution, that matter will be arrayed before a jury for trial. This will involve a panel of 12 randomly chosen citizens. 7 It is the duty of the jury to listen to all the evidence relating to the charge, listen to the judge's direction on the law applicable to the case and then deliberate as a collective on what they consider to be the facts of the case and to bring in a general 8 verdict of 'guilty' or 'not guilty' on the charge.
A juror's oath is to 'truly try the defendant and return a verdict according to the evidence'.
9 Do juries perform their role accordingly? There is much evidence of juries acquitting against the weight of evidence especially in cases that involve the Official Secrets Act 10 although its willingness and ability to strike down the law in other cases has been questioned by writers such as Cornish as noted. The judge's role is to direct the jury on the law and the jury's role is to apply that law and direction to the facts as they find them.
The principle of jury supremacy in matters of fact in a case is without equivocation. The notion of perverse verdict, therefore, undermines this principle. However, there is evidence that juries sometimes work on an entirely different plain, rejecting, in one case, the evidence of the chief prosecution witness whom they described as a 'tin pot dictator'
and 'pipsqueak' civil servant and in the other, ignoring the finger print evidence presented in court.
11
In his 2001 review, Auld LJ recommended that:
7 S.1, Juries Act 1974. They are required to be between the ages of 18 and 70, on the electoral role and UK residents for at least 5 years since the age of 13. 8 In cases such as insanity, a special verdict may be acceptable. 
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On the face of it, this appears reasonable enough given that a verdict that can be proved to be against the weight of evidence seriously undermines the criminal justice system.
However, on further reading, it becomes clear that the reasoning is at best defective and at worst, impractical. Predictably, many have condemned this recommendation as displaying deep distrust of the jury system, 13 wholly unacceptable -a serious misreading of the function of the jury -and that the right to return a perverse verdict in defiance of the law or the evidence is an important safeguard against unjust laws, oppressive prosecution or harsh sentences.
Zander is in good company. Many from the legal profession who responded to the review identified with these sentiments.
Legal historical tradition has been cited in support of the right that Auld LJ recommends against. Indeed, Bushell's case 14 , cited above, is a case in question where the jury returned a verdict supposedly against the weight of evidence.
There is further, the famous cases of Clive Ponting, Randle and Pottle as well as other modern cases where the jury has done just that. In such cases, it has been observed that the tyranny of the judges has been replaced by that of the jury. should be clearly expressed instead of being disguised as justice.
15
The fact is that neither the system nor the government wishes for this to be the case and worse, although such practice is condoned by a collective acquiescence and institutional ignorance, it has never been definitively proven that a verdict is perverse given that the fact finder is supreme in this role.
These sentiments are well understood though. They clearly are the frustration felt by those who are charged with investigating and prosecuting crime and those who play a role in the judicial process. 16 It also shows a direct tension between the government's stated purpose of the CJS -the control of crime -and the position sometimes 17 taken by lay assessors in criminal trials. However, it exposes another dimension -the diverging perception of justice by the public and the institution. More importantly, it underlines the need for accountability from the jury.
It is argued further, that the issue turns on the meaning of 'perversity' in a jury trial. Do juries really return perverse verdicts? One is inclined to answer in the negative. There are good reasons for this. 16 In the English Courts, the role of the judges is not to obtain a prosecution but to be the servant of justice. 17 It would be quite incorrect to claim that juries always disregard the evidence and return a verdict that is contrary. History is instructive in this regard and it has been suggested that some of the blows for justice were not struck by the jury but by appellate judges over the years. See Blom-Cooper op.cit.
The Grounds for Perversity
A criminal trial in an English Crown Court is a matter before a judge and jury. As has been noted above, the jury is charged with deciding on matters of fact, the judge, on matters of law. The judge's role, by no means easy, is relatively straight-forward. Even here, objectivity is by no means a given factor. The guidelines on sentencing in England and Wales indicate that judges are allowed to make subjective evaluations within a set of given guidelines when handing down sentences. These include age, family backgrounds and propensity to commit further crimes. Even the demeanour of the victim or the support of the family are factors that a judge is advised to take into consideration. 19 The decision as to whether or not the prosecution has discharged its burden to the standard set is a matter for the jury. The point is not that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required but that the judge, in determining the evidence in a trial, only has to consider the relevance, probative and prejudicial value of a piece of evidence and the fairness of the trial. In so doing, as a matter of clinical sterility, he need not be mindful of any subjective elements in the trial. He must stay objective as far as that evidence or witness is concerned. Doubt is a subjective principle turning on the principle of belief based on the lack of knowledge. The judge, presented with evidence and other matters of evidence must decide if the weight of evidence before him is sufficient to allow the matter to go before a jury. It is a matter of the relevance and sufficiency of evidence -an altogether measurable outcome -before a matter can be put to a jury, which is why a' judge' is better placed to explain his verdict in the higher courts when he sits alone or with a panel. 1985) . 21 There is an element of prejudgement in a criminal trial but this does not relate to the final verdict of the jury. This occurs when the judge has to rule on matters of abuse of process or in response to an application for a 'no case to answer' from the defence. Following R v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr app. Rep 124, 145 JP 405, 'where…the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or weakness depends on the view to be taken of a witness's reliability or other matters which are, generally speaking, within the province of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts, there is evidence upon which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the jury'. 22 In a Civil Trial by judge alone, the judge will hear evidence, consider the law and deliver a reasoned judgement summarising the legal principles governing the case and the facts to which they must be applied and giving his decision. If his decision is challenged, an appellate court may ordinarily review both the legal ruling and the factual findings and the applications of one to the other'. The jury, on the other hand, swears to 'truly try the defendant and return a verdict according to the evidence'.
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For the jurors, it is not a simple matter of objectivity. Their task is the more onerous one.
Not only must they sift through the admissible evidence tendered in court that is relevant to the case, they must also purge pieces of inadmissible evidence from their minds.
26
They must consider the demeanour of the witnesses as part of their deliberation process and the trial. They must watch the actors in court. They must make a judgement on the oratory and theatricals skills of the counsels, assess the body language of the witnesses, measure the weight of a piece of evidence and determine from the tone of the judge where the court's sympathy lies without allowing such bias, if any, to affect their decision. They must also call upon their own experiences, prejudices, social status, sense of justice, morality and community inclinations. In addition, each juror must consider the role played by police officers and others investigating the crime, the state of the nationdo they feel safe in their homes, do they have a sense of civic responsibility, do they think the offence charged should be a crime etc?
When they retire for deliberation, the jurors must consider their relative positions and be part of a negotiating process that pitches one juror's wit and understanding against another's, one juror's interpretation of the evidence against another's and one juror's skill of persuasion and negotiation against another's. The jury then considers the offence charged, the prohibited act and the corresponding law.
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They then have to apply the law to the facts and consider if the mental element is present and thus if the offence is proved and if the trial process has produced a situation from which they must draw a particular inference. Has the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt? Further from that, they must now search their consciences to see if the decision they have reached is one that they can live with given all the circumstances of the case. Sometimes, this is in spite of or because of the evidence.
Some jurors may be religious. Others may be atheists. Some may be fundamental in their moral perspectives, yet others might be dispassionate or liberal in their views. Some may believe in strong society values as a whole reflected in a strong government and yet others may prefer the individualistic approach -taking liberty at face value. Then there is the question of culture and community values that intermingle with the desire to achieve social cohesion. The fact of trial by jury is that of judgment by members of one's society in the company of a judge. The judge stays objective while the jury has the task of mixing objectivity with subjectivity. But a criminal jury gives no reasons. Its answer is in a cryptic general verdict -guilty or not guilty…the process of reasoning by which its decision is reached is never disclosed and can only be a matter of inference'.
28
Given then that the jury is allowed certain amount of evidence, has the right to return a verdict according to its conscience, is allowed all the human qualities necessary for the reasonable man to live and that there are twelve of them randomly selected to hear the case, how do we define perversity?
27 They may consider the action proved but the law not broken or no offence caused -a classic case of jury nullification of law. 28 Lord Bingham in R V Pendleton ibid.
Perversity in this context is the rendering of a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable observer could support it.
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If this is the case, then the system appears to be held hostage to fortune. The fatality of the above statement lies within itself. First, it implies that having heard all the evidence, a decision has been reached by a 'reasonable observer'-objectively -and the jury must concur. If we adopt this approach, we have invented a surrogate jury whose role is to determine the case ad rem and the real jury can only countenance such verdict.
Secondly, it arrogates objective isolation to the surrogate jury -this 'reasonable observer,' who has deliberated the case entirely on the evidence without the experience and contribution of eleven other people to draw from.
Third, the decision of this single reasonable objective observer, having been made, now awaits countenance by the jury on a subjective level to legitimise it.
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The fourth position is even more troubling for the institution. It is a culmination of the above and assumes that the interpretation of the evidence should only go in one direction.
As a result, if the jury does not interpret it in that way, any decision emanating from its deliberation is deemed perverse. The decision maker could be the judge bowing to the promptings of his objective analysis and by implication, the position of the prosecutor or otherwise.
Put in this context, it becomes clear that that which is proposed is that all verdicts must be perverse that involve a subjective element. Since all jury decisions involve subjective assessment, all jury verdicts are, by definition, perverse. This is a rather startling and repugnant proposition.
It is also clear that in this context, on an application of Galbraith, once a judge has decided to put a matter before a jury with the understanding that it might convict, any acquittal would constitute a perverse verdict. As observed, such a point of view usurps the position of the jury and makes a mockery of its independence. charged with preaching on a Sunday afternoon to an unlawful and tumultuous assembly.
The jury delivered a special verdict deciding that they were only guilty of preaching in Grace Church but not unlawfully. The evidence was enough to support a charge of preaching in Grace Church on a Sunday afternoon, if that indeed, was an offence. There was insufficient evidence that they were preaching to an unlawful and tumultuous assembly. The verdict returned by the jury was entirely consistent with the weight of evidence and as far as interpretation of the evidence and their conscience went, consistent also with the juror's oath. Yet, if they had just returned a guilty verdict without qualifying it, that might have been the end of the matter. If preaching in Grace Church was an offence, then the defendants were guilty. However, of preaching to a tumultuous assembly, the answer was in the negative. The jury found its conscience sufficiently aligned to its purpose to qualify its verdict. If it had simply answered guilty, justice would not have been done.
In the case of Pat Pottle and Michael Randle, the jury listened to the evidence which was quite conclusive as to guilt given that the accused wrote a confession of what they did.
The jury considered the law that was being applied and decided that the sentence imposed on Blake was 'so inhuman that it is alien to all the principles with which a civilised country would treat its subjects.' They acquitted. They clearly sympathised with the actions of the accused in helping Mr. Blake escape though the offence was proved. They also disagreed with the law under which the prosecution was brought.
In the 19 th Century, capital punishment was meted out to people for stealing sheep, horses and cattle and for robberies to the value of 40 shillings -raised to £5 in 1827. Juries undervalued goods to avoid the death penalty.
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The issue is the definition and degree of perversity as an extension of one person's interpretation over another. Thus, to the extent that guilt or innocence is a matter for the jury and no one else, calling a jury's verdict perverse ignores the process of deliberation and subjective evaluation.
If the argument is that the courts or other observers have decided what the evidence is and interpreted it and that the jury has no business deciding otherwise, why not then dispense with the jury altogether or better still have it as a façade but fetter it with Auld LJ's recommendation?
If the issue is that of allowing twelve randomly chosen citizens to deliberate as they see fit, then the matter of perversity does not arise. Given that evidence can be interpreted in more ways than one, to the extent that we cling to the word, every verdict is potentially 31 Devlin, P Trial by Jury ibid.
perverse regardless of which court delivers it because some other 'reasonable observer' could always disagree with it. Even reasoned judgements, delivered by judges can be attacked as perverse.
As a further attack to juries, Auld LJ commented in his report that: All these cases show a pattern of deception and evidence gathering that had nothing to do with the jury. If experts conspire to deceive and other experts are deceived, even the jurymen of 'average ignorance' will be deceived. One may well wonder why the judges who had more access to the facts did not invoke the concept of due process. Seeing the poor quality of the evidence prepared for trial, they might have determined that there was insufficient evidence to put the matter to the jury. In his defence of the jury and in response to Auld LJ., Zander observed that:
the high profile mis-carriages of justice were, in the main, the result of human factors such as police officers who fabricated evidence, scientists who made mistakes or suppressed evidence. '…no system is or could ever be, fully proof against human error or human wickedness.
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Professor Zander appears to be echoing Kant who opined that:
…from the crooked timber of humanity, nothing straight can ever be made.
36
This really sums up the position and our attitude to all our institutions but particularly to lay participation in the criminal justice system. It is worth noting that the fact that perfection or certainty is elusive should not deter us from pursuing it.
Transposing this to the requirement for an explanation, unless we start making some demands of the tribunal of facts relative to its verdict, we will continue to quibble over the supposed perversity of its decisions.
It may well be that Auld LJ is right. Perhaps the jury gave too much weight to the prosecution's case, took for granted the veracity of the evidence of the police officers and the evidence tendered and convicted given the publicity surrounding the atrocities.
Perhaps, had the jury decided, against the weight of evidence, to return a 'perverse verdict,' such an injustice might have been avoided and no doubt, the public outcry from a road constructed for it by pretenders. That would be in violation of the separation of powers thus requiring the jury to rubber stamp the opinion of the powers that be. Our criminal trial system reposes the domain of fact finding to the jury and for good reasons.
In this task, they are not expected to passively and mechanically apply the law like automatons but are compelled both by a sense of duty and their juror's oath to do, as they understand it, justice in the light of the law, the evidence and their own experience. Thus, the power to return a perverse verdict is, arguably, comparable to the Irish constitutional concept of 'congruence' or 'normativism'.
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In the US, some State Constitutions explicitly provide that jurors shall judge questions of fact and law. 40 The jury thus retains a position as the ultimate arbiter of the state of the law. By having a jury of twelve randomly selected individuals, the ordinary people are admitted into the legal process to assess, for the community, within the confines of a specific case, the laws which determine the parameters of the constitutional traditions and arrangements of their society. In this way, political and moral discourses enter what would otherwise be the exclusive arena of legal discourse. Perverse verdict is inherent in the jury's role as the conscience of the democratic community and a cushion between citizens and overly restrictive legislative intervention. When they return verdicts perceived to be as such, juries justify their very existence.
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There are many cases of perverse verdicts where the laws involved were not applied because they did not reflect popular conceptions of justice. justified by twelve of their peers chosen at random from the community in the form of a guilty verdict.
Devlin posited the common consensus holding that:
No tyrant could afford to leave a subject's freedom in the hands of twelve of his countrymen.
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It is the legislative fear of the democratic power of the jury -the forceful opportunity granted the citizenry to give their opinion directly on the laws enacted on their behalf which has led to restrictions on the jury. This is clearly seen in the Criminal Justice Cornish's position is that juries rarely strike a 'blow for democracy' and so should not really be celebrated for its stubbornness. But what is the position of the courts?
The Court of Appeal
When the idea was floated for establishing a court of appeal, one of the arguments against such an idea was that allowing an appeal against conviction would undermine the role of the jury. 60 This was, thus, the recognition that following a judicial direction on the law, the jury is charged with the task of deciding the facts of a case and to determine whether or not the defendant has been proved guilty of the crime charged or a lesser crime.
The Criminal Appeal Act 1907 explains the ambit of its authority in section 4 (1):
The a consideration of fresh evidence on an appeal against a conviction. This latitude to call a verdict perverse, it is submitted, the Court denies itself and for good reason too. The evidence is fresh precisely because it was not available at the jury trial.
That being the case, any decision reached by the jury could only, hopefully, have been based on admissible evidence present at the time. The discovery of fresh evidence does not alter that position much less be the premise for declaring a verdict perverse.
There is some currency in the statement that the 'value of a jury's verdict lies in its unanimity, not in the process by which they arrived at it'. 62 However, given that unanimity has been undermined, attention may justifiably turn to that process.
Louis Blom-Cooper continues:
…there can be no room in the due process of criminal justice for the jury to import factors outside the ambit of factual evidence. 
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This passage receives approval and is cited by Lord Steyn in the Privy Council case of Crossdale cited above.
As observed, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter for the jury and not the judge.
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The judge will decide on whether or not there is sufficient evidence to go the jury. The 65 Or in the event of an appeal against a conviction and the admission of new evidence, the matter might be resolved by the Court asking 'whether the jury, if they had knowledge of the fresh evidence would necessarily have come to the conclusion that they did'. R v McNamee (unreported), December 17 1998, Court of Appeal Criminal Division at page 5 and quoted by Lord Bingham in R v Pendleton ibid. 66 Damaska argues that attention should thus focus on the quality of the evidence the jury has to consider. 67 Devlin P 'Trial by Jury,' The Hamlyn Lectures, 8 th Series (1956 Series ( republished 1988 68 The standard of proof in a civil case is 'on a balance of probability'. jury will decide if the evidence presented is enough to reach a decision. If it has any doubt, it is expected to give the benefit of it to the defendant.
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Once that is done, the weight to be given to the evidence and the outcome of the case are matters for the jury. Neither the judge nor any one else is as equipped or placed to return a verdict. If the judge determines that there is insufficient evidence to be put before a jury, he will declare a no case to answer. If he decides there is enough, the matter is left to the jury. If the judge thinks the matter should be stopped for reasons of due process, he will rule accordingly. If he is not prepared to stop the case, he will reject the submission of no case to answer and say that the matter is one of credibility and weight for the jury. The first would be the guilty defendant who, due to what we might call 'technicalities', has been acquitted and who knows of his guilt. The second would be the victim in the event that he categorically knows of the defendant's guilt but unable to prove it in court.
The third would be an innocent defendant who has been convicted and the fourth would be the jury who, having agreed or unable to agree on guilt or innocence, nonetheless decides to acquit or convict 72 for reasons best known to it. However, since the acquitted 'guilty' defendant is unlikely to complain, the matter rests there. Since the 'knowing' victim has failed, by his counsel, to discharge the burden of proof, that is the end of the matter. And since the jury does not have to explain itself, the decision rests.
If the convicted defendant is able to identify an irregularity in the trial process or a question of law raised by the trial, he can resort to the appeal process to challenge the verdict.
It is argued that the use of the word 'perverse' to describe a profound disagreement with a jury's verdict based on an objective assessment of the evidence is an understandable one.
However, it should be vigorously resisted as an affront to the principles of trial by jury.
Thus, it might be helpful to refer to a verdict as 'unsatisfactory' rather than perverse. This is because an objective assessment, limited to factual admissible evidence, may predict the outcome of a trial. However, if on a combination of objective and subjective assessments, the jury delivers a verdict deemed inconsistent with the factual evidence, the objective observer may be forgiven for referring to that verdict as being an unsatisfactory outcome of a trial.
72 Since S.8 Contempt of Court Act 1981 makes it an offence to divulge events during jury deliberations, we are to be informed by any jury that its decision was perverse. The only people likely to find out are those close enough to sit at the various dinner tables where each juror discourses his experience away from prying eyes and ears.
Unsatisfactory would be the description of a result whose subjective element explains the leanings of the jury and recognition that it may or may not have paid homage to factual evidence. Perverse, on the other hand, acknowledges the usurpation of roles. However, as has been stated above, the weight to be given to any piece of evidence and a decision as to the outcome of a trial is a matter for the jury alone -at least until we change the role of the jury in our criminal trials.
In the recent case of R v Wang, 73 the law Lords were confronted with the question
In what circumstances, if any, is a judge entitled to direct a jury to return a verdict of guilty?
The appellant had argued that the judge may never do so. The Crown contested that view.
The ruling is worthy of note. Citing Stonehouse, 74 the Lords stated:
Nonetheless, judgement according to conscience appears to undermine the notion of a perverse verdict. This is because there is, inherently, a trade-off between the subjective and objective elements of assessment, we must assume, during deliberation. In such cases, a 'perverse verdict' is easier traced to the collective conscience of the jurors.
The question to be determined is whether a modern society should allow such conscience to be part of a democratic process and what benefits, if any, there are.
In an age of accountability, the mirage of legitimacy conferred upon a jury by tradition appears unstable. Yet, verdict according to conscience appears to be the 'catch all' phrase used as the only way to explain the system's failure to make robust demands of the tribunal of fact. On the other hand, if the jury is prevented from returning a verdict according to its conscience, there would be no need to have the system. This theory of the perverse verdict advances the argument for a system of transparency and jury accountability in the form of an explained verdict as a way of bringing further understanding to the English Criminal Justice System. This will also remove the legal non-event referred to as a 'perverse verdict'.
